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SUSPENDING SOVEREIGNTY 
REASSESSING THE INTERLOCKING OF OCCUPATION, 
FAILED AND FRAGILE STATE, RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT, AND INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP 
(LESSONS FROM LEBANON) 
Noemi Gal-Or* 
This Paper argues that the traditional international legal discourse on occupation fails to 
reject the condition of international relations, and their governability by international law, at 
the turn of the 21" century. This Paper suggests re-conceptualizing the concept of occupation 
by linking it to the discourse of failed andfiagile states and the responsibility to protect. 
A contemporaneous understanding of occupation needs to reject its transforming 
relationship to sovereignty. Occupation represents a state of inteference with the external 
aspect of sovereignty, which ultimately infringes also on the state of internal sovereignty. In 
contemporary world politics, occupation arises also fiom a chain of successive situations 
interfering with sovereignty wherein internal sovereignty becomes "vitiated" ("$ailed and 
fiagile state"), and creates a condition conducive to inteference with external sovereign@ The 
outcome of this order of impingements on sovereignty represents a state wherein sovereigniy 
was suspended. 
The condition ofsuspendedsovereignty triggers the new norm of the responsibility toprotect. 
This Paper submits that re-vitalization of the concepts of leasehold and trusteeship offers an 
elegant, perhaps face-saving outlet, hence potentially constructive approach to empower the 
failed andfiagile state in re-establishing its sovereign plenary control over its territory and 
ending an occupation-like situation. 
The analysis of the Lebanese situation is an example of the arguments raised in this Paper 
and does not fit the traditional post World War II (WWII) occupation legal mould for neither 
belligerent nor non-belligerent occupation. The complex inter-state relationship linking 
Lebanon-Syria-Iran-Israel, and which is intricately interlaced in a state-to-non-state actor 
( M A )  web as played out in the relationship between Israel-South Lebanon Army on the one 
hand, and between Iran, Syria and Lebanon-Hezbollah on the other hand, serve to illustrate 
the new 2lst century conditions. These conditions press for an updating of the traditional 
understanding of occupation. 
I would like to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to anonymous readers for their 
thoughtful and helphl comments. 
Noemi Gal-Or 
I .  Introduction 
This Paper challenges the direction followed by the international legal discourse 
on occupation and asks whether it adequately reflects the condition of international 
relations and their governability by international law, at the turn of the 2 1" century. The 
Paper offers preliminary thoughts on the development and refinement of the concept 
of occupation and the surrounding legal applications and implications. It is couched 
within the recent discourses of "failed and fragile states7' and the "responsibility to 
protect." 
I argue here that the reality of occupation has now surpassed the confines of the 
legal concept of occupation as developed in the post World War I1 (WWII) era. To 
understand occupation, the concept of sovereignty must be brought under close 
scrutiny. Sovereignty is a legal "fiction" comprising two aspects attributed to the 
state: External (relations between actors outside the state) and internal (domestic 
relations).' Sovereignty also denotes the convergence of three competences: Personal, 
governance (the ability to render public services), and t e m t ~ r i a l . ~  Sovereignty arises 
under certain conditions which require international recognition. In this framework, 
occupation represents a state of interference with the external aspect of sovereignty, 
which consequently infringes also on the state of internal sovereignty. 
A contemporaneous and more accurate understanding of occupation requires 
refinement to reflect its evolving relationship to sovereignty. In this Paper, I suggest 
considering occupation also as arising from a reverse chain of successive situations 
interfering with sovereignty. In this display of occupation, at the outset, internal 
sovereignty becomes "vitiated," which in turn creates a condition conducive to 
interference with external sovereignty. I further suggest conceptualizing the outcome 
of this reverse order of impingements on sovereignty as representing a state wherein 
sovereignty was suspended.' 
' Nkambo Mugenva, Subjects oflnternational Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW253 
(Max SBrensen ed., 1968). 
Id.; David Ruzie, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUB IC (2kme Partie, 1975). 
This approach requires identifying and classifying conditions interfering with internal sovereignty, 
and attracting the violation of external sovereignty, as well as identifying the succession and 
overlapping of stages in the process. This Paper represents the beginning of such an analytical 
enterprise. "Suspension," rather than "transgression," more accurately describes the situation of 
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A fresh look at history suggests that occupation is comprised of instances reflecting 
a plethora of modes of sovereignty suspension. These instances possess the following 
common denominators: post-colonial events that are a result of colonial mandates 
following World War I (WWI)--which were condoned by the League of Nations-to 
govern foreign territories; succeeded the mandate regime in form of trusteeship and 
peace-keeping operations after WWII and were administered by the United Nations; 
and incited contemporary humanitarian interventions and other (post) New World 
Order collective security  operation^.^ Recently, the concept of failed and fragile state 
(FFS)5 was coined to capture the essence of situations in which internal sovereignty is 
compromised and corresponding sovereign competences weakened. Concurrently, the 
impact of mitigated internal sovereignty, often entailing a corresponding weakening of 
external sovereignty, has propelled the birth of another new term-the responsibility 
to protect (R2P).6 R2P implies a new and supplementary understanding of limits on 
external sovereignty juxtaposing lessons learned from interferences with sovereignty 
with the "classical" concept of occupation (which focuses on inter-state relationships 
which compromise external sovereignty) and now warrants a review of the applicable 
law. 
In the past several decades, a new form of de facto occupation has become most 
conspicuous. It is manifest in an amalgam of intra-and inter-state conditions under 
an ongoing and evolving process whereby sovereign competences have ceased performing their 
functions effectively, regularly, and in an "orderly" fashion. Transgression suggests a causal 
relationship that emphasizes intervention and action; whereas suspension is neutral as to the 
cause and effect, more nuanced, and encompasses a wider spectrum, e.g., action, passivity, drastic 
alteration but also protracted process and adiustment. Perha~s the definition relatine to music is 
- 
the most accurate: "The action of deferring the progression of a part in harmony by prolonging 
a note of a chord into the following chord, usually producing a temporary discord; an insistence 
of this, a discord so produced .. ." THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2094 (3d ed. 1968) 
(emphasis added N.G.-0.). I will not elaborate on the relevance of consent in municipal law due 
to lack of space. 
These modes are extremely varied and include, for instance, the particular state of sovereignty 
of Hong Kong prior to and following the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration; Cyprus, especially 
since 1974; Haiti, Kosovo (Serbia), Somalia (beginning with the 1990s until the writing of this 
Paper); and Lebanon since the mid 1970s, to mention a few examples. More examples will be 
addressed herein. 
See treatment of this concept in Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
at http:l/geo.intemational.gc,ca/cip-pic/current~discussions/~agile-resoces-en.aspx (l t visited 
Jan. 28,2008). 
First conceived in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, The 
Responsibility to Protect, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Dec. 
2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp. See Section 111 B infi-a for a discussion on 
R2P. 
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which sovereignty is tempered. The situation of states characterized as "failed or 
'%agile," politically often resembles that of occupation. However, unlike the Hague 
Law of inter-state occupation,' FFS situations involve non-state actors (NSAs), 
specifically individuals, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are 
recognized subjects of international law only to a very limited extent and largely for 
the sake of their own protection. Also, FFS situations tend to conjure up images of 
civil war and asymmetrical war: Ethiopia and Eritrea mingling in Somalia's  affair^;^ 
no man's land in the Kandahar Province exhibiting the Afghanistan government's 
weakness and coupling it with Pakistan's failings in Waziri~tan;~ Kosovo's unsettled 
status and Serbia's lack of effective control over the area;I0 and Haiti's precarious 
government situation. " 
Addressing the legal void pertaining to the newly identified FFS condition, the 
contemporary, ever-evolving concept of R2P1* was coined. The brainchild of the 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) under 
the leadership of its Minister (then) Lloyd Axworthy," Canada sponsored the 2001 
' See also The Hague Convention No. 11, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and 
its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 187 
Consol. T.S. 429 (1900); The 1907 Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907 and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,36 Stat. 2277,2306,205 Consol. T. S. 277 (1907) [hereinafter Hague 
Convention IV & Hague Regulations]. 
' The Ethiopian and Eritrean mingling in Somalia's affairs; US Warns Eritrea, Ethiopia on Somalia, 
ABC NEWS ONLINE, July 30 2006, available at http://www.abc.net.au~news/newsitems/200607/ 
s 170060 1 .htm. 
INDEPENDENT PANEL ON CANADA'S FUTURE ROLE R.I AFGHANISTAN, REPORT TO THE CANADA DEPARTMENT 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AD INTERNATIONAL TRADE (JAN. 2008), available at http://www.canada- 
afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistanilibra/docs-en.asp; Rahimullah Yusufzai, Waziristan: Bin 
Laden i Hiding Place?, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk~2lhi/south~ 
asid3532841 .stm. 
lo Kosovo's unsettled status and Serbia's lack of effective control over the area; Daniel McLaughlin, 
A Declaration oflndependence--or War?, Dec. 7, 2007, THE INDEPENDENT, available at http:l/ 
www.independent.co.uWnews/europela-declaration-of-independence--or-w-76356Ohtml. This 
situation has changed since Kosovo's declaration of independence of February 17,2008, and the 
accumulating international recognition, e.g. by the Government of Canada on March 18, 2008. 
available at http:l/news.gc.calweb/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=386299. 
" Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Reconstructing Haiti at http://geo. 
international.gc.ca/cip-pic/current~discussions/reconstructinghaiti-en.aspx (last visited May 27, 
2008). 
Conscious of the current debate (discussed later herein), I prefer to use "concept" rather than 
"norm" to the R2P. 
" Press Release, Axworthy Launches International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, available at http://www.iciss.ca/pressl-en.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2008). 
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International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which produced the 
report "The Responsibility to Protect."14 Mirroring the growing concern for security in 
a post-Cold War era, R2P was consequently endorsed in the U.N. Secretary General's 
2004 report "A More Secure World: Our Shared Re~ponsibility."'~ Arguably, R2P has 
thus come to represent the activist aspect of the broader concept of human security: 
The report endorses the emerging norm of a responsibility to protect 
civilians from large-scale violence-a responsibility that is held, 
first and foremost, by national authorities. When a state fails to 
protect its civilians, the international community then has a further 
responsibility to act, through humanitarian operations, monitoring 
missions and diplomatic pressure-and with force if necessary, 
though only as a last resort. And in the case of conflict or the use 
of force, this also implies a clear international commitment to 
rebuilding shattered societies.I6 
Although the term FFS is absent from the report,17 and R2P is not limited to FFS 
situations, it was undoubtedly designed to prevent conditions that can be characterized 
as FFS. Indeed, in spite of the identified need to "sav[e] lives within countries in 
situation of mass atrocity"l8 the report lists, in addition to genocide, "mass murder 
and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation 
and exposure to disease,"Ig as giving rise to the R2P of "every State when it comes to 
l 4  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra note 6.  
l5  The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Executive Summary, 7 203, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/565, (Dec. 2, 2004), available at www.un.org/secureworId [hereinafter A MORE SECURE 
WORLD]. The report specifies the following: 
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to 
protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last 
resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious 
violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved 
powerless or unwilling to prevent. 
Id. at 7 203. Reaffirmed in S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. SIRES11674 (Apr. 28, 2006) Arguably, 
"serious violations" of international humanitarian law is a very broad characterization. 
l 6  Id. at 4. 
l 7  But explicit nonetheless, cJ: JosC E. Alvarez, Notesfrom the President, 23 ASIL NEWSLETTER 1 
(Summer 2007). 
I S  A MORE SECURE WORLD, supra note 15, at 7 199. 
l 9  Id.7201.  
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people suffering £rom avoidable cata~trophe."~~ Arguably little if anything then, prevents 
the international community from considering a condition of a state's degeneration into 
political decay, or a situation where the FFS is incapacitated, i.e., suspended sovereignty, 
as harboring a threat to international peace and security. FFS externalization of the 
internal wrongs consequently falls within the ambit of the new duty to protect,2' while 
R2P is being turned into a tool to resurrect a state's sovereign c~mpetences .~~  
At this backdrop, I further suggest that the FFS suspended sovereignty condition 
and the triggering of the R2P beg the re-vitalization of the concepts of leasehold 
and trusteeship. These legal instruments are valuable in both assisting a FFS in re- 
establishing its sovereign plenary control2' over its temtory and ending an occupation- 
like situation. Specifically, where neither a belligerent nor non-belligerent occupation 
Id. While it does not yet elaborate on other possible instances of "avoidable catastrophe" in 
and from "shattered states," it envisages such possibility by stating that "to redress catastrophic 
internal wrongs [the international community] is prepared to declare that the situation is a 'threat to 
international peace and security' [which] is not especially difficult when breaches of international 
law are involved." Id. 7 202. 
21  The report reflects the international community's indecisiveness concerning the available and 
appropriate means to tackle such a situation: 
There has been, as a result, a long-standing argument in the international community 
between those who insist on a "right to intervene" in man-made catastrophes and those 
who argue that the Security Council, for all its powers under Chapter VII to "maintain or 
restore international security," is prohibited from authorizing any coercive action against 
sovereign States for whatever happens within their borders. 
Id. 
While some interpret this debate as driven by advocates of a revival of hegemoniclimperialist 
designs of international law on the one hand (for this comment I am indebted to an anonymous 
reviewer), it can also be read as leaving the door open for a wider interpretation of the means 
available to address the threat, namely within the "spanning a continuum involving prevention, 
response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies," on the other hand. Id. 
Certainly, the U.N. authorized foreign military intervention at the contemporary stage of legal 
development excludes pre-emptive action. Alvarez attributes precisely such intention to the U.S. 
protagonists of the R2P: "R2P treats sovereignty as more hindrance than protection and the U.N. 
Charter less as sovereignty's guarantor than the guarantor of the rights of individuals." Alvarez, 
supra note 17, at 12. Intervention is permissible only in situations of international armed conflict 
orpost bellum, e.g., peacekeeping, peace-building but also in new post 911 1 borderline situations 
as the Afghanistan intervention mode suggests. 
Not coincidentally, this matches well the general thrust of the report's discussion of the R2P: It is 
open-ended, foreseeing--even endorsing-the development of international law. If this is so, then 
the concept of R2P, which is still in its infancy, may also benefit from other legal opportunities 
made available by the concept of suspension of sovereignty. 
l2 This should absolutely not be confused with what Alvarez refers to as imperial driven "conditional 
sovereignty" (Alvarez, supra note 17, at 11). 
23 Formerly referred to in the U.N. Charter as self-government and independence. 
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is being acknowledged, the institution of trusteeship, enabled or substituted by a 
leasehold agreement, offers an elegant and perhaps face-saving outlet.24 
In this paper, I focus on the example of Lebanon where (similar to some of 
the previously mentioned examples) sovereign competences have diminished 
significantly. Particularly, from 1970 onwards, different periods were extracted out of 
the purview and control of the Lebanese government. These territories did not remain 
vacant; rather they were placed under foreign state and/or local NSA domination. 
Such was the situation in South Lebanon during the control by the Israeli proxy South 
Lebanese Army (SLA); direct Israeli military occupation; the presence of Syrian 
forces throughout the rest of the country; and Hezbollah controlled "enclaves" within 
a Beirut neighborhood and widespread areas in South Lebanon. Precisely because 
these lands have not remained without governance, the possibility of occupation, albeit 
of a "non-classic" belligerent formZS deserves consideration. Particularly interesting 
in the Lebanese situationz6 is the inter-state relationship, e.g., Lebanon-Syria-Iran- 
Israel, which has been intricately interlaced in a state-to-NSA web as played out in 
the relationship Israel-SLA on the one hand, and Iran, Syria, and Lebanon-Hezbollah, 
on the other hand. While politically representing a FFS situation, no equivalent 
encompassing de jure characterization of such situation exists as yet. A legal concept 
of suspended sovereignty, as a new recognized characteristic of occupation, may offer 
a peaceful alternative to military intervention. 
11. Review of the Legal History of the Concept of "Occupation" 
International legal concepts are born out of international political necessity. The 
evolution of the concept of occupation is no exception. Now is a suitable moment 
24 Lebanon's seven-point plan's suggestion to place the Shab'a Farms under United Nations 
jurisdiction pending a permanent delineation of the boundary more than hints at such possibility. 
S.C. Res. 392, TI 62, U.N. Doc. SRES1392 (2007); Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), 10, S.C. Res. 147, U.N. Doc. 
Sl20071147 (Mar. 14,2007) see chapter "G. Delineation of Borders". 
25 Belligerent occupation is normally considered a situation where the direct occupant (ofthe occupied 
population's territory) is a state, e.g., Germany following World War 11, or Israel's occupation 
of foreign territories following June 1967. Alternatively, a situation of non-international armed 
conflict, where land comes under the control of the warring parties, is not de jure qualified as 
occupation, even when effective control is established. 
2"lso characteristic of the Somalia case, see supra note 8 .  
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to assess the correlation of law and politics regarding occupation for it increasingly 
appears that the political reality of occupation has been surpassing its legal confines of 
the post WWII era. Occupation arising in the context of military conquest, and leading 
to the seizure of control over a foreign territory, was conceptualized in the nineteenth 
century law of war as a matter of inter-governmental relations. It represented a 
legitimate means of achieving national goals and presumed a state of peaceful 
coexistence between occupant and local p~pulation.~' Just prior to the turn of the 20th 
century, the principles underlying this doctrine were already under transformation. By 
the end of WWI, political developments related to the rising claims to, and struggles 
for, national self-determination; the expansion of the notion of sovereignty to include 
peoples and not solely governments; and the altering relationship between the public 
and the private spheres of society have all begun leaving their mark on international 
law.28 The immediate lessons of the WWII experience prompted further important 
improvement of the law by focusing attention on the welfare of individuals-rather 
than collectivities-under o c c ~ p a t i o n . ~ ~  These specifications reflect a new theoretical 
approach transforming the law of occupation into a phenomenologically defined 
concept.30 It has come to represent a state of "effective control of a power (be it one or 
more states or an international organization, such as the UnitedNations) over a temtory 
to which that power has no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of 
27 Reflected in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, see EYAL BENVENISTI, HE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF OCCUPATION 27, 30 (2nd ed. 2004). See also Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral 
Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J .  INT'L L. 3 (2006). 
28 They crystallized, among others, in the Hague Convention (IV), supra note 7. 
29 The Lieber Code instructing the conduct of the U.S. forces in the American Civil War is considered a 
chief foundational source ofthis shift. See Harris, supra note 27, at 4. For post WWII developments 
see, ICRC. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. In an 
effort to further institutionalize the law of occupation beyond declaratory customary international 
law, the drafters of the Articles 47and 64 et seq. of the Fourth Geneva Convention recognized the 
temporality of occupation in relation to sovereignty and the correlative limitations on the control 
by the occupant. This is complemented by other relevant provisions see, e.g., Articles 9 and 11 
and see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 5, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
609 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
Most recently, the US ArmyiMarine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual of 2007 has put 
security for civilians as a priority preceding the destruction of the enemy. UNITED STATES ARMY 
AND UNITED STATES MARME CORPS, U.S. A R M Y ~ ~ A R I N E  COUNTERINSURGENCY FI LD M ~ N U A L  (2007) 
[hereinafter U.S. ARMYMARME COUNTERINSURGENCY FI LD MANUAL]. See also FUND FOR PEACE, THE 
BOSPHORUS CONSENSUS DECLARATION (2007). 
See also BENEWISTI, supra note 27, at 98-99. 
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that ter r i t~ry,"~~ focusing on the means of occupation but not altering the essence of 
o c c ~ p a t i o n . ~ ~  However, the disregard for these new rules exhibited in states' practice 
as well as the legal disco~rse,~' and displayed throughout the post-WWII period and 
well into the post-Cold War era, have now come to challenge the status quo of the law 
of occupation: "[A] double challenge: a challenge to the principles that underlie the 
laws of occupation, and a challenge to their enf~rceability."~~ 
" Id. at 5. For effective control see also Aeyal M. Gross, The Construction of a Wall between The 
Hague and Jerusalem: The Enforcement and Limits of Humanitarian Law and the Structure of 
Occupation, 19 LIEDEN J .  INT'L L. 1-48 (2006); Yuval Shany, Faraway, So Close: The LegalStatus 
of Gaza after Israelk Disengagement, Y.B. INT'L HUMAN. RTS. L. (forthcoming 2008). 
32 BENVENISTI, supra note 27, at 5. 
33 With the exception of the Israeli occupation after the 1967 war, all other occupants after 
World War I1 refrained from resorting to The Hague Regulations or the Fourth Geneva 
Convention as the source of their authority or as a guide to their actions. The propensity 
to avoid the regime of occupation is particularly noticeable in the various occupations of 
the 1970s and early 1980s. These occupations, the international reaction to them, and 
other international developments during this era, have greatly complicated the law of 
occupation. 
Id. at 180. 
Recent occupants did not view themselves as occupants and, for reasons discussed above, 
preferred to confer responsibility on local governments they established. As a result, 
occupants+xcept for Israel with regard to the territories occupied in 1 9 6 7 4 i d  not have 
to struggle with the adaptation of the law of occupation to the contemporary challenges of 
administration. Thus, for example, aside from the interpretation of Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations by Israeli institutions, no other state practice with regards to this basic article 
exists after World War 11. 
Id. at 182, cf: also 189-90. 
This observation has been put to test following the recent 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. led 
"Coalition of the Willing." While the U.S. and British positions on Iraq's post bellum situation 
and pre-establishment of the fledgling Iraqi government are framed within the formal law 
of occupation, the extent to which this stance is indeed reflected in deeds and compliance, is 
debatable. Harris refers to a political "New Model" of multilateral occupation which deviates 
from the former's emphasis on basic humanitarian provisions, and favors nation-building, the 
latter not yet forming a part of the body of occupation law. Harris supra note 27, at 11. The U.S. 
ARMYMARINE COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 2007 (supra note 29) may signal a change of 
course. 
34 Id, at 107. Another recent example for the challenge in applying the law of occupation is the 
public opinion campaign just launched by the NATO forces in Afghanistan releasing videos of 
insurgents while in breach of international humanitarian legal obligations. Paul Kring, Halt 
Detainee Transfers Now, Canada Urged, THE GLOBE & MAIL, NOV. 13,2007, A1 5; Alan Freeman, 
Canada Violating Geneva Treaty, MPs Say, THE GLOBE & MAIL, NOV. 17, 2007, A20; Daniel 
Leblanc, Opposition Attack Child-Detainee Transfers, THE GLOBE & MAIL, NOV. 29, 2007, A, 
A6. 
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The overwhelming magnitude of the problematique concerning the discrepancy 
between factual situations similar to occupation, on the one hand, and the extant 
international law, on the other hand, resonates in the work of the International Institute 
of Humanitarian Law.3S While non-international conflict (which often captures 
the condition of a FFS, or of foreign involvement in a third state amounting to 
"occupation like" conditions) is regulated by the Additional Protocol I1 to the Geneva 
C~nvent ions ,~~ which governs the duration of the armed conflict, the end of the non- 
international conflict remains a non-addressed issue. Consequently, a post bellum 
like situation remains excluded from the law of non-international conflict. Let us, 
however, assume for the sake of argument, that occupation is being recognized as a 
possibility in a non-international conflict. Then, will the application ofArticle 43 of the 
Hague Regulations on belligerent occupation and peace-building offer any guidance? 
Dinstein's focus on the distinction between executive and legislative functions brings 
the legal challenge into the fore: The first obligation has to be implemented by the 
executive (and the judicial) branch of the Military Government of the Occupying 
Power, whereas the second obligation devolves on the legislative branch. 
In the final analysis, the first obligation requires acts of commission: the 
Occupying Power must take the necessary and proper measures in order to restore 
and ensure public order and life. Conversely, the second duty postulates primarily 
acts of omission: avoiding the repeal or suspension of existing laws, except in cases 
of "empCchement ab~olu."~' 
Unlike during occupation (in an international conflict), the victorious party 
in a non-international conflict will most likely be already occupying not only the 
executive but also judiciary and legislative positions (e.g., it may be a coalition of 
previously rival parties, or a result of a de facto territorial cession). To be sure, it 
is precisely the purpose of the actor challenging the incumbent government in a 
non-international conflict to change the laws in force.38 This clearly contradicts the 
35 YORAM DINSTEM, MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, & CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY (2006). 
j6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter 
Protocol 111. 
" Yoram Dinstein, Legislation Under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent Occupation 
and Peacebuilding, (Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Haward University, 
Occasional Paper Series 3, Fall 2004). 
This, for instance, has been the argument of entitlement inherent in struggles for self-determination, 
which have come to be considered an inter-national type of conflict: "The claim of the lawful 
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objective of parties in an international armed conflict as envisaged by the Hague law 
of occupation.39 Therefore, a party in a non-international conflict will be neither 
struggle for self-determination . . . coupled with the notion of illegal 'foreign occupation' could 
seem to import major qualifications, indeed, a revolution, in the law of occupation." BENVENISTI, 
supra note 27, at 187. 
39 For example: 
In accordance with the second part ofArticle 43, the Occupying Power must respect " l a  lois 
en vigueu" (the laws in force) in the occupied territory, except in cases of "emplchement 
absolu." Respect means that-as spelled out in the Brussels Declaration-the Occupying 
Power has to maintain the laws in force and not modify, suspend or replace them with its 
own legislation. The term "les lois" appears to encompass only promulgated laws (whether 
basic or trivial; national or municipal; civil or criminal; substantive or procedural). Yet, 
there is no indication that the framers of the Hague regulations intended to exclude from 
the ambit of Article 43 "common law," tribal law (especially of indigenous and nomadic 
people) or other forms of domestic customary law. 
Dinstein, Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and 
Peacebuilding, supra note 37, at 4. 
Also, consider the following: 
5. Protocol I1 includes language, political or other opinion, and national or social origin as 
prohibited bases of adverse distinction. These criteria are drawn from the law of human 
rights. Whereas it is clear that there is an increasing overlap of human rights law and 
the law of armed conflict, particularly in non-international armed conflict, the extent 
to which customary international law encompasses these expanded grounds is unclear 
in the latter context (bearing in mind that a non-international armed conflict usually 
involves a political dispute or clash between ethnic groups). 
DINSTEN, SCHMITT, & GARRAWAY, supra note 35, at 15. 
Moreover, in reliance on the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. 
Tadic: 
The extension of rules applicable in international armed conflict "has not taken place in 
the form of a full and mechanical transplant of those rules to internal conflicts; rather, 
the general essence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation they may contain, has 
become applicable to internal conflicts." Therefore, one should be cautious whenever 
applying provisions--or interpretations thereof-intended for application in international 
armed conflict to situations of noninternational armed conflict (see paragraph 7 of the 
commentary accompanying Rule 1.2.3). 
Dinstein, Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and 
Peacebuilding, supra note 37, at 2 1. 
And furthermore: 
6. Since a non-international armed conflict may consist in part of riot situations, it is 
important to bear in mind that the use of riot control agents to control a riot is perfectly 
permissible. Admittedly, it is not always easy to determine when a riot has ended and 
"above the threshold fighting has started (see discussion of the threshold issue in the 
commentary accompanying Rule 1.1). 
Dinstein, Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and 
Peacebuilding, supra note 37, at 34. 
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able nor willing to comply with these rules.40 
Certainly, a major factor contributing to the insufficiency of the legal concept of 
occupation consists in the evolution of the nature of armed conflict; the blurring of the 
boundary between international and non-international conflict; the emerging of the 
asymmetric war; and the ensuing challenge to the prevailing concepts of international 
legal per~onality.~' Lebanon serves as a quintessential example. An observation of the 
state of governance and exercise of sovereignty at the turn of this century, 
suggests a gap between the current doctrines of occupation and legal personality on the 
one hand, and political fact, on the other hand. The state of Lebanon has been troubled 
by internal rifts, carried on from pre-independence and lasting ever since, in spite of 
efforts to regulate the tense heterogeneous web of Lebanese political relationship by 
means of a political arrangement4' Lebanon's susceptibility to external influences 
This relates also to Harris' (supra note 27) concern with multilateral occupation and nation- 
building. 
41 All reflected also in variations of the FFS. For international legal personality see Noemi Gal- 
Or, A Reassessment of the International Wrong: Self-Help Remedies for International Wrongs 
& Countermeasures in Humanitarian Law, (forthcoming) based on a lecture at the 35th Annual 
CCIL Conference Proceedings, 2006; Zooming In and Out: The Tree and the Forest in the Justice 
Approach to Terrorism, Adapting North American Security Relations to Terrorist Threats, J .  
CONFLICT STUD. (forthcoming 2008); Claudia Kissling, The Evolution of CSOs'Legal Status in 
International Governance and Its Relevance for the Legitimacy oflnternational Organizations, 
in CIVIL S o c ~ n  PARTICIPATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A CURE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT? ch. 
2 (Jens Steffek et al. eds., 2007); Janne E. Nijman, Paul Ricoeur and International Law: Beyond 
'The End of the Subject '. Towards a Reconceptualization oflnternational Legal Personality, 20 
LELDEN J .  INT'L L. 25-64 (2007). The evolving status of the individual, natural and legal, person, 
the NSA, and the international organization (10) as subjects of international law is leaving no 
doubt that a reform of international law is practically under way. It is imperative that it includes 
also the law of occupation. 
42 Post 911 1 Afghanistan and Iraq, among others, also serve as such examples. For lack of space, I 
will defer this discussion for another time. 
43 Elie Kedourie, Ethnicity, Majority, and Minority in the Middle East, in ETHNICITY, PLURALISM AND
THE STATE IN THE MIDDLE AST (Milton J. Esman & Itamar Rabinovich eds., 1988). 
As it emerged into independence at the end of World War 11, Lebanon included areas . . . 
[with] large numbers of Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims who felt no particular attachment to 
the Lebanese state. To hold all these heterogeneous elements, the Lebanese constitution 
of 1926 included elaborate provisions . . . the so-called confessional system. But after 
independence the system broke down quickly. In 1958, and more seriously after 1975, 
civil war dealt a powerful and perhaps mortal blow to the confessional system. And there 
can be no doubt that the mobilization of the Sunni and Shi'ite citizens of Lebanon by 
outside powers-the United Arab Republic, Syria, and latterly the Islamic Republic of 
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is evidenced in Syria's military presence and de facto direct rule in the country for 
nearly 29 years;44 the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
headquarters and base of operations (including the so-called Fattah-land in Southern 
Lebanon after the PLO's forceful expulsion from Jordan in the early 1970s); Israeli 
incursions and occupations during varying periods of time since the late 1970s; and 
for a similar length of time-Iranian interference through proxies-most notably the 
Lebanese Hezbollah ~rganizat ion.~~ In today's vocabulary, Lebanon represents a very 
fragile state, unable to fully sustain its sovereign competences (at least, a condition 
of partial suspension of sovereignty) and thereby attracting and facilitating foreign 
intervention (often amounting to foreign oc~upat ion) .~~ The recent 2006 Lebanon 
Iran-was the main cause of the Lebanese Civil war . . . [and] destroyed the balance of 
communities in Lebanon. 
Thus ... in Lebanon the European vocabulary of politics and the modem European 
concepts of the state have visibly led not to greater welfare and security but to insecurity 
and destruction for the inhabitants . . . 
(Id. at 3 1 .) 
" Since 1990, when Syria sent forces to Lebanon to end the civil war there which broke out in 1975 
and until the withdrawal of its armed forces from Lebanon in 2005, following the February 2005 
assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, see Syria 'Starts Lebanon Pullback, ' BBC NEWS, 
(Mar. 8, 2005), available at http:i/news.bbc.co.uW2/hi/middle~east~4331045.stm; Biography: 
MK Rajc Hariri, available at http://www.rhariri.com/default.aspx (The Official Website Former 
Prime Minister of Lebanon 1992-1998,2000-2004). 
45 Which will discuss in infia Part 111. 
46 TO what extent Syria's occupation, or Iranian via Hezbollah's control, over parts of Lebanon 
amount to non-belligerent occupation or occupation, respectively, is of course the point that I am 
attempting to elucidate in this Paper. While attracted by the Lebanese civil war, foreign presence 
on Lebanese soil has not been related to a Lebanese war of national liberation. The control that the 
PLO exerted over areas in Lebanon during the 1970s and early 1980s, and up to the present-in the 
refugee camps, was related to the Palestinian struggle for statehood. ~ c c o G t s  of the challenges to 
the Lebanese state building endeavor are attributed to ethnic and religious tensions and strategic 
visions of its former mandatory "protector" France, rather than to a 1 9 ~  century notion of nation- 
building or 20b century struggle of national liberation. 
Greater Lebanon was created by France in 1920 .. . . The French decision to establish 
greater Lebanon was made in consequence of Maronite pressure and for want of a reliable 
alternative. Many Frenchmen favoured a united Syria with a small autonomous Lebanon 
on the Ottoman model .... The political system of Lebanon which developed between 
1943 and 1958 depended upon three principles . .. all [of which] were called into question 
and the consequence was the virtual destruction of the state. 
M.E. YAPP, THE NEAR EAST SINCE THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 105, 265 (1991). Rabinovich observes 
that "[tlhe idea of a Lebanese entity, rooted in a historic tradition and serving as bridge between 
East and West, though apparently secular, was perceived, certainly by its opponents, as Christian in 
orientation. Indeed, the Lebanonism of the Kata'ib, despite much elaboration and sophistication, 
was ultimately Maronite-Christian." Italnar Rabinovich, Arab Poli~ical Parties: Ideology and 
Ethnicity, in Esman & Rabinovich, supra note 43, at 165. 
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War, the difficulties encountered by the U.N. International Investigation Commission 
investigating the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri as well as 
the current highly volatile political stalemate in the country clouded by a series of yet 
unexplained assassinations of eight anti-Syrian politicians since 200447-a11 represent 
a specific confluence of intra-and inter-state factors demonstrating the sovereign's 
incapacitation. This is a conspicuous example illustrating how FFS conditions 
operate as a magnate attracting foreign intervention and amounting to a not-yet- 
legally-identified form of occupation. In this fissure, where a state of suspension of 
sovereignty has been established, and where other actors actively and effectively rival 
the official and formal government over "1 'ordre et la vie publics en respectant, sauf 
empichement absolu, les lois en vigueur duns le pays,"48 occupation appears to take 
on an additional and new form. 
In the course of modem history, legal instruments were developed to address a 
'Void" in sovereign competences. These arose in the context of colonialism in pre- 
Westphalian societies and included  protectorate^^^ such as the post WWI grant of the 
power of international legal mandates to governments to administer foreign territories 
on behalf of the League of NationsS0 and were consequently reformulated into 
trusteeships after WWII. These were no longer administered through the intermediate 
of a foreign government but rather by a "consortium" of governments, i.e., the 
4' Zeina Karam, Lebanon Has Record of Assassinations, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, N V. 24, 
2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn~contenicle/2006/11/241 
AR2006112400269.html. 
Convention Concernant les Lois et Coutumes de la Guerre sur Terre, 1907, 205 Consol T.S. 277, 
295 (C. Pany ed., 1980) cited in Dinstein, Legislation Under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: 
Belligerent Occupation and Peacebuilding, supra note 37, at 2. 
49 The term "suspension" implies effective previous sovereign title. It remains open for debate 
whether the essence of sovereignty reflects pre-colonial legal situations in non-European polities. 
This is an issue too complex to address here for it requires the comparative study of, at least, the 
European, Communist, and Development doctrines of international law, and discussion of the 
concept of terra nullius. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
Suffice it here to mention that there are several international legal arrangements ranging on a 
continuum, and representing, albeit indecisively, situations wherein sovereign competences have 
been suspended, even relinquished. The protectorate and the vassal relationship tend to the latter 
engagements, which at face value, purport to be consensual (the protected state having requested 
the protection of the p o w e h l  state), see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE NON-STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
THE NON-STATE INTERNATIONAL L W 65-68 (1970) [in Hebrew] and Mugerwa, supra note 1, at 
252, or a non-belligerent occupation. Yoram Dinstein, The Beginning and the End of Belligerent 
Occupation, Oral Presentation at Forty Years after 1967: Reappraising the Role and Limits of the 
Legal Discourse on Occupation in the Israeli-Palestinian Context: An International Conference, 
Jerusalem & Tel Aviv (June 5-7, 2007) (personal notes, available with author). 
316 SUSPENDING SOVEREIGNTY: LESSONS FROM LEBANON 
United Nations. The protectorate, mandate, and trusteeship, respectively, represent 
successive stages in international law's development in addressing situations of 
"lack" or "partial" sovereignty and their relation to occupation (foreign rule). Thus, 
the mandate system was innovative in two main respects. First, it provided for the 
three categories of the mandates reflecting the three "degrees of preparedness" for 
independen~e.~' It is, however, clear that at least in one type of mandate (type A), 
foreign administration was established over territory conquered by a sovereign.52 The 
second innovation of the mandate doctrine compared it with the protectorate (and the 
colonial protectorates) which consisted as a trusteelagent. The mandate represented 
powers "on behalf' of the League of Nations (an international organization, not a 
sovereign) and under its authoritative s u p e ~ i s i o n . ~ ~  The fact that the successor of the 
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League ofNations. For instance, Iraq and Jordan were considered 
to be at an advanced stage of independence for their internal and external relations proved to 
possess "a measure of international personality even before they attained full independence." 
Mugerwa, supra note 1, at 264. I will not elaborate on the three categories for lack of space. I 
will therefore forego the discussion of status of occupied territories that formed previously part 
of a sovereign state but were "tom" from it, only to be placed under mandate administration, and 
subsequently handed over to U.N. trusteeship management. 
5Z In the case of territories "lost" by Turkey and Germany, which were defeated in an armed conflict 
(WWI), the transfer of territorial powers was settled by means of a peace treaty-and assigned 
to several states, notably Britain, France, Belgium, and Japan. Abdullah El Erian, The Legal 
Organization of International Society, in SBrenesen, supra note 1, at 61-62, and Dinstein, The 
Beginning and the End of Belligerent Occupation, supra note 50, at 70. Here the doctrine of 
the mandate system according to which the mandated territories were not yet fully (capable) of 
independence gets somewhat "fudged." Specifically, already prior to the end of WWI, Britain 
and France divided the formerly Ottoman territories in what became known as the controversial 
Sykes-Pico Note (1916), a secret agreement partitioning the Ottoman Empire between these two 
powers (and which contradicted some assurance given by T.E. Lawrence "ofArabian to the Arabs 
when mobilizing them to the revolt against the Turks). The Sykes-Picot Agreement, May 15 & 
16, 1916, Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC), available at http://www.jmcc. 
org/documents/sykespicot.htm (last visited May 27,2008). ALAN PALMER, DICTIONARY OF MODERN 
HISTORY 1789-1945 (1983). For instance, the border between Syria and Lebanon was subsequently 
defined in yet another agreement between Britain and France in 1923, and ratified by the League 
of Nations in May 1935. HAIM SARBARO, THE LEGITIMACY ISSUE OF THE LEBANESE CLAIM TO THE 
'SHEBAA FARMS' N RELATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER (2006). 
53 El Erian, supra note 52, at 63. The mandatory state's administration of the mandated territory 
was regulated by resolutions of the League Council. agreed upon with each Mandatory, the latter 
required to report annually to the League Council. A Permanent Mandates Commission consisting 
of independent experts examined the reports and advised the Council respectively. Inhabitants of 
the mandated territories were legally entitled to petition the League, and disputes regarding the 
mandates were justiciable before the Permanent Court of International Justice. Consequently, "the 
mandatory or trust power exercised a defacto sovereign power over the territory. But the exact 
nature of the de jure position has never been clear and has given rlse to a number of conflicting 
theories." Mugerwa, supra notc 1, at 264. 
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mandates-the trust territories-were smaller in size and population in comparison 
with the mandated territories, and that the trusteeship system of the United Nations 
eventually "evaporated," bespeaks the arrangement's  shortcoming^.^^ All of this, 
however, does not invalidate the fundamental thrust ofboth mandate and trust doctrines, 
namely that the population @eople) of territories under international tutelage deserves 
the protection and assistance of the international community, for a limited term, to 
support them in either establishing or recovering their sovereign competences. 
In conclusion, where the new scope of actors exploits or enhances the debilitation 
of the sovereign's competences, these competences become suspended and a new de 
facto form of occupation (neither explicitly belligerent, nor consensual) is established. 
This factual scenario calls for a de jure doctrine of o c ~ u p a t i o n . ~ ~  A new law will 
supplement the Hague and Geneva law of occupation by (a) identifying a new status of 
occupation, and (b) expanding the arsenal of regulative provisions to include limited 
term trusteeship as a means towards ending (reversing) the suspended condition of the 
sovereign's competences. 
111. Suspending SovereignV6 and de facto Occupation: Lessons from Lebanon 
In this Paper, I argue that under a certain FFS situation, a legal condition of suspension 
of sovereignty ought to be identified. It arises where the sovereign (its government) is 
" These shortcomings suffered also from lack of clarity in the transition of the mandate system 
from the extinct League of Nations to the trusteeship system of the United Nations. Dinstein, The 
Beginning and the End ofBelligerent Occupation, supra note 50, at 74. 
55 See, e.g., rights and duties of occupant, of ousted government, transition into a state of occupation 
and from occupation to post occupation, consent of the population under occupation, etc. 
56 Michael Strauss, Is Transdisciplinary Dialogue Possible? Translating International Relations and 
International Law to Each Other, presented at International Political Science: New Theoretical & 
Regional Perspectives. IPSA International Conference. Concordia University, Montreal (Quebec), 
April 30-May 2, 2008 
The notion of sovereignty has also defied a uniform definition. Its essential components 
parallel those of a state itself-territory, population and government-but as many as 12 
distinct and overlapping meanings of sovereignty have been identified as the term applies 
to states, and Fowler and Bunck admit that the meaning "varies according to the issue that 
is being addressed or the question that is being asked. 
For a thorough review of the gradual historical evolution of the concept of sovereignty see Hanna 
Danwall, Guantanamo Bay, A Legal 'Black Hole'? (2004) (unpublished Master Thesis, Faculty of 
Law, University of Lund). 
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denied control over part of, or the entire, state territory due to (a) paramilitary control 
by a NSA, and where the situation cannot be characterized as a non-international 
armed conflict; (b) foreign military indirect control but no direct armed confrontation 
with the state's military or other armed forces; and (c) the sovereign did not formally 
andfor freely consent to the foreign intervention. Suspended sovereignty, therefore, 
combines elements similar to the current legal concept of non-belligerent occupation 
with a highly incapacitated FFS condition. It emerges from the triangular interface 
of inter-state, state-NSA, and state-international relations. With this background in 
mind, it logically follows that international law turn to address two issues relevant to 
suspended sovereignty: First, the specific essence of occupation in a FFS condition5' 
and second, the restitution of sovereignty. 
Lebanon is the quintessential proto-type of a FFS whose sovereignty has been 
suspended and matches the expanded concept of occupation proposed here. Lebanon's 
protracted submission to Syria, Israeli interference with Lebanese sovereignty, PLO's 
effective control over sections of its territory, and increasing Iranian mingling in 
Lebanese affairs represent a case in point. The 2006 Lebanon War exposed to the world 
that the Lebanese government's failure to exercise its powers over and control its own 
territory had reached a new climax. Here, a particular constellation of intra- and inter- 
state conditions converged into a grey zone falling neither within non-international, 
nor international, conflict and hence transcending mere occupation. The southern 
part of the country and a specific municipal neighborhood in the capital of Beirut 
I will elaborate on the doctrine of sovereignty in a future broader version of this Paper. 
Meanwhile, see also Noemi Gal-Or, Towards A Transdisciplrnary Discourse on the Link of Trade 
and Investment, International Law, and Global Governance: Is a New Terminology Needed? 
(Submitted for publication, 2006) (on file with author). Several other relevant publications (among 
a significantly more voluminous selection) addressing the dilemma of interpreting sovereignty, 
including the tension between the notion of sovereignty and its constituent competences are Peter 
Nyers, The Accidental Citizen: Acts of Sovereignty and (un)Making Citizenship, 35 Eco. & Soc. 
22-41 (2006); Heinhard Steiger, Remarh Concerning the Normative Structure of a Modem World 
Order in A Historical Perspective, in LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
75-101 (Thomas Gross ed., 2003); Veronique Voruz, Sovereignry. Power and Resistance, 15 INT'L 
J. SEMIOTICS L. 231 (2002); Jean-Jacques Morin, Droit et souveraineti a I'aube du X?11sit.cle, 25 
CAN. YB INT'L L. 47 (1 987); Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 
599 (1998). Most recently, Carsten Stahn reviewed this conceptual dilemma in Responsibility to 
Protect: Polifical Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm? 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99 (2007). 
5 7  Where the "modem occupant" (BENVENISTI, supra note 27, at 147) runs to the assistance of a 
presumably aid requesting state; or, where the occupant exercises effective control in the foreign 
state but eschews admitting to it (most likely for political reasons), consequently avoiding (or 
preventing) the application of the rules of occupat~on. Id 
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were removed from the purview of the Lebanese government and became effectively 
controlled by the H e z b ~ l l a h . ~ ~  This legally non-definable "hybrid" actor epitomizes 
a combination of a non-insurgent (until after the Lebanon War), yet paramilitary, 
organization partly representing a NSA-an Iranian surrogate supported by Syria- 
and partly a state actor-with elected representation in the Lebanese government 
both in the cabinet and in the o p p o ~ i t i o n . ~ ~  The ensuing situation of Lebanon defies 
legal characterization. It does not fit within the scope of Article 42 of the Hague 
Regulations; the claim that Hezbollah represents a foreign army establishing its 
control over foreign temtory is unlikely. Equally, the Fourth Geneva Convention 
cannot be invoked because it does not involve the protection of individuals from 
foreign rule; on the contrary, the majority of the local population within the territory 
appears to be supportive of the "unofficial ruler" (the Hezbollah). Likewise, the 
two Additional Protocols are irrelevant to the situation for most of the length of its 
duration. In addition, currently60 there is neither a legally recognized international nor 
non-international armed conflict in Lebanon. 
This state of affairs gives rise to crucial questions. Does the situation reflect a 
conscious andfiee decision by the Lebanese government to abstain from governing 
the southern part of the country as well as to refrain from entering rehgee camps, and 
therefore qualifies as an expression by the sovereign government regarding the exercise 
of its plenary sovereignty over all of Lebanon? If the answer is yes, and assuming for 
the sake of the argument that Hezbollah's control is classified as occupation, any 
Lebanese government decision may be taken as implying consent, i.e., resemble the 
situation of non-belligerent occupation. Facts on the ground, however, refUte this 
alternative. The Lebanese Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora, and members of his cabinet, 
have for several months spent most of their time in hiding, and have been running the 
state's affairs out of a five-star hotel in Beirut rather than from the official government 
58 Not only continuous media reports (most recently, Marc MacKinnon, In Lebanon, Somethingk 
Got to Give, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, NOV. 23, 2007, at A14) and scholarly writings (a detailed and 
encompassing book developed from his doctoral thesis, see AMAL SAAD-GHORAYEB, HISBU'LLAH: 
POLITICS IWD RELIGION (2002)) identified the Hezbollah among the important and crucial actors, 
at least in Southern Lebanon. The U.N. as well has recently reached this conclusion in Report of 
the Secretary-General on the Implementation of S.C. Res. 1701, U.N. Doc. SIRES1730 (June 28, 
2007). 
59 SAAD-GHORAYEB, supra note 58. 
60 With the exception of the recent events in the Nahr el-Bared camp north of Tripoli, and the 
apprehension surrounding the possibility of a renewed civil war. See Lebanon Army Takes 
Control of Camp after Battle, REUTERS, ept. 2,2007, available at http://www.reuters.comiarticle/ 
topNews/idUSLO26 1343920070902. 
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premises. Moreover, their freedom of movement across the country they have been 
elected to politically govern is practically circ~mscribed.~~ Foreign states (Syria, 
Iran, and Israel) continue to intervene in the country and although Syria withdrew 
from Lebanon, a threat of renewed use of military force is constantly looming in 
the background. There is currently no operative and representative government in 
Lebanon (whether democratically elected or not), that is capable of either consenting 
to, or withholding consent against, foreign intervention. Lebanon's sovereignty 
therefore, is suspended; it is in an expanded mode of oc~upa t ion .~~  
I now turn to a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the proposed 
legal concept of suspended sovereignty and FFS, on the one hand, and R2P, on the 
other hand. 
A. Fragile/Failed State 
There is no legal definition applicable to the condition of FFS. The term has been 
developed as part of an attempt to institutionalize the challenges facing the U.N. at the 
dawn ofthe 21" century.63 Lebanon, which falls squarely within this political category, 
6' MacKinnon, supra note 58. 
62 Instinctively, the particular version of occupation suggested here represents essentially a special 
condition within the FFS situation. However, I am not excluding the possibility that further and 
comparative research will find otherwise. Arguably, the condition in the Waziristan region of 
Pakistan, Darfur in Sudan and the spillover into nearby Chad and Somalia are just a few examples 
which lend support to a thorough consideration of the proposition of a legal concept of suspended 
sovereignty. Although each of these examples represents a unique case, and neither is identical 
to the Lebanese scenario, all share a mix of situations falling into the legal void between an 
international non-armed conflict and non-international non-armed conflict. 
63 Mats Bredal, Reconciling the Irreconcilable?, in A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED 
RESPONSIBILITY, BEHIND THE HEADLINES-REPORT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL ON 
THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE 7 (2005). 
By what criteria does one identify a state "sliding towards collapse"? More difficult still, 
one imagines, will be to persuade a state thus identified to accept the 'invitation to attend' 
a meeting of the commission [proposed UN Peacebuilding Commission]. Even so, the 
rationale behind and the analysis that accompanies the proposal are convincing and well 
supported: "failed states" or "states in distress" clearly pose profound challenges to the UN 
membership as a whole. 
"This loss of capacity of the traditional individual state of the 21" century to perform its functions 
for the people is not only a loss of factual power, might, strength and means. It is a structural loss 
and therefore it concerns all states, not only the 'failing state' ..." Steiger, supra note 56, at 98 
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exemplifies the challenge. To arrive at a legal characterization, the status of a FFS 
must be determined in relation to the legal concept of sovereignty. Two instances 
of sovereignty are pertinent here: State sovereignty, which is critical for a diagnosis 
of a condition of FFS, and sovereignty of other political entities and international 
organizations, which becomes relevant in relation to the restitution to full sovereignty 
and hence applies to the R2P. 
In the first instance, namely state sovereignty, two closely related concepts are 
of crucial importance: Territorial sovereignty and title to sovereignty. Territorial 
sovereignty may be original or deri~ative.~" A state cannot exist without sovereignty 
and both are intrinsically connected. Being a state implies, by definition, sovereignty 
under international law.6s Lebanon would not be a state without its territory, which 
it acquired in a derivative mode gaining independence in 1943 from its tutelage 
under the French Mandate for Syria. Title to sovereignty, which is closely connected 
to territorial sovereignty, emphasizes the notion of title. It thus concerns both the 
factual and legal terms under which temtory is deemed to belong to one particular 
state only, and embodies the essence of temtorial sovereignty in the sense that as a 
sovereign over territory, the state enjoys a certain type of competence-sovereign 
competence-which is a consequence of the title. It is used for comparative purposes 
in determining competing claims to territorial ~overeignty .~~ It comprises an essential 
and necessary element, namely the power of disposition. While this power may be 
limited by treaty, the title however remains unaffected as long as the limitation on the 
power of disposition is not 
(emphasis added). The challenges have been chronicled in the works of the U.N., beginning with 
the listing in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra note 6, 
specifically the protection of citizens from man-made catastrophes such as mass murder, rape, 
starvation, i.e., humanitarian disasters and which are often related to other catastrophes (e.g., 
man-made environmental degradation, poverty, etc.) identified as necessary ingredients of human 
insecurity. 
Danwall, supra note 56, at 23. 
Traditional international law provides five modes of acquisition of temtorial sovereignty; 
[sic] occupation, prescription, accretion, cession and conquest. These are divided into 
original and derivative modes. An original acquisition is obtained through occupation or 
accretion and involves no transfer of sovereignty from a previous sovereign. The remaining 
modes are derivative and involve a transfer of sovereignty from a previous sovereign. 
65 Id. 
" Id. at 24. See Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829,838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) cited in 
Id. 
67 Id. 
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The manifestation of title may take on different forms, depending on temporal 
and spatial  condition^.^^ When a sovereign state distributes its sovereign competences 
to other state~,6~or disposes of its territory, it will nevertheless continue to possess 
titular, residual or nominal sovereignty (or engage in divided sovereignty in form 
of a condornini~rn).~~ In contradistinction, the state exercising plenary power over 
the territory, but lacking the capacity of ultimate disposal, possesses only efective 
sovereignty. It is crucial to note that the doctrine envisages sovereignty only vertically 
and not horizontally, meaning that the sovereign state retains the highest authority. 
"[Rlesidual and effective power, together make up the totality of ~overeignty."~~ 
At the diagnostic stage of a FFS condition, the distinction between residual and 
effective sovereignty becomes instrumental. I argue that a FFS condition is established 
when the residual and effective sovereignties collide72 at the point where they, in fact, 
negate each other. In theory, this may be referred to as a suspension of sovereignty, 
in other words, a temporary freezing of the competences corollary to sovereignty. 
Legally, territorial sovereignty is not transferable to a NSA, either domestic or foreign 
(e.g., of the sort of the Hezbollah) or an international organization (e.g., the U.N., 
for that matter). Even if this was legally possible, such transfer would require to 
be made by explicit conventional or implicit customary legal avenues.73 Lebanon 
did not recognize the Hezbollah as a government of any state. Even assuming that 
Syrian involvement in Lebanon were consensual and not under duress, while this 
might amount to derogation74 from owning complete sovereignty, it could not qualify 
as transfer of sovereignty to Syria. Factually, however, Syria has been possessing 
effective control, and the Hezbollah continues to exert effective power in parts of 
Lebanon; both have been doing so to the detriment of Lebanon's own efective 
sovereignty. Because Lebanon has long lacked conjoint effective and residual power 
over its territory-and the derogation from its sovereignty conflicts with the effective 
Id. at 25. 
69 Not to NSAs or other political entities and international organizations. 
'O Danwall, supra note 56, at 26. 
Cited in id. at 27. 
72 Rather than mutually complementing, e.g., in case of a treaty representing disposition of power 
over territory. For the various ways available to divide sovereign competences see Strauss, 
Guantanamo B q  and the Evolution of International Leases and Servitudes. supra note 56, at 6. 
73 Arguably, also general principles of international law. See G. James Apple, What are General 
Principles of International Law? 2 INT'L JUDICIAL MONITOR (JulyIAug 2007), available at http:// 
www.judicialmonitor,org/current/generalprinciples.html. 
74  For this point generally, and "derogation" of sovereignty specifically see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLE 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL L W (6'" ed. 2003) cited in Danwall, supra note 56. 
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powers exercised within its territory by Syria and Hezbollah (as well as Iran75 and 
Is rae le i t  seems more accurate to define its situation as a FFS condition of suspended 
sovereignty. 
B.  R2P: Responsibility to Protect 
Developing in tandem with the notion of FFS is the newly evolving norm R2P. Stahn 
describes the evolution of the concept as "almost like a fairy tale."76 First conceived 
in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001 report 
on The Responsibility to Protect,77 R2P then found its way into the U.N. High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004 report entitled "A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Re~ponsibility,"~~ only endorsed thereafter by the U.N. Secretary-General 
in his 2005 report "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights for and later that year incorporated into the U.N. General Assembly's 
75 In analyzing the Hezbollah, Saad-Ghorayeb says: 
Another factor explaining the Shi'ites' non-resistance and the non-materialisation of the 
Islamic Resistance during the 1978 invasion [by Israel] was that the Islamic Revolution 
in Iran had not yet taken place. Thus, the Shi'ites reacted militantly to the 1982 invasion, 
after the Revolution's occurrence in 1979 .. . . But in the final analysis, there is much doubt 
as to whether Hizbu'lla, the political movement-cum-party, would have emerged had it not 
originated as a conglomeration of armed Islamic groups resisting Israel. 
See SAAD-GHORAYEB, supra note 58, at 10. More specifically: 
[ilnsofar as many of its cadres were drawn from Amal, the origins of the party do not 
actually lie in it. In point of fact, the fountainhead of Hizbu'llah was not located in Lebanon 
but in the religious academies of Najaf in Iraq where hundreds of young Lebanese Shi'ites 
studied in the early 1960s and 1970s [prior to the Iraq-Iran war and the Iranian revolution] 
under the tutelage of radical Shi'ite ideologues such as Kumayni and Muhammad Baqir 
as-Sadr. 
Id. at 13. This influence was practically and physically reinforced with "Iran's dispatch of 1,500 
Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) to the Biqa' in the wake of Israel's 1982 invasion, which played 
a direct role in the genesis of Hizbu'llah." Id. at 14. Saad-Ghorayeb chronicles the enhancement 
of the Hezbollah by Iran with the assistance of Syria throughout his work. 
76 Stahn, supra note 56, at 99. 
77 Id. 
78 A MORE SECURE WORLD, supra note 15. 
79 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. At591 
2005, 1 16-22 (2005), available at  http://www.un.orgllargerfreedomicontents.htm, (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2008). 
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"2005 World Summit O u t ~ o m e " ~ ~  resoluti~n.~' 
R2P was conceived in a spirit similar to that of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
namely focusing on the individual and informed by the law ofhuman rights. Associated 
with concerns regarding, among other things, the loss of state capacity, characteristic 
G.A. Res. 6011, 17 138-39, U.N. GAOR 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RESl6011 (Oct. 24, 2005) 
reprinted in Stahn, supra note 56, at 100. 
81 Whether a normative transformation is, in fact, under way, is yet to be determined. "These findings 
suggest that something is wrong here. Either the concept of responsibility to protect is actually 
not so new and innovative as portrayed, or the qualification is wrong." Stahn, supra note 56, at 
102. I choose to refer to R2P as a norm in the making that may either crystallize, or dissipate. 
The I.C.J. interpretation in Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 
2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26) addresses state responsibility in matters pertaining to the realm of the 
R2P. While the case marks the first time that a U.N. member state has been tried for genocide, 
the I.C.J. takes care to avoid and prevent misunderstandings that may arise in connection with the 
new concept of R2P. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the I.C.J., emphasized: "We have been 
concerned only with genocide-and, I may add, genocide in the legal sense of that term, not in the 
broad use ofthat term that is sometimes made." Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 
Statement to the Press by H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins," (Feb. 26,2007), available at http://www. 
icj-cij.orglpresscomiindex.php?pr=1898&pl=6&p2=1&search=%22SearchBosnia+and+Herzeg 
ovina+v.+Serbia+and+Montenegro%22 (emphasis added N.G-0). In Serbia, where a NSA was 
involved and acted outside the purview of the sovereign, the I.C.J. limited its interpretation of 
the scope of state responsibility in the case of genocide to the responsibility to prevent and the 
responsibility to punish, to the exclusion of the commission of the crime of genocide itself: 
If the VRS [the army of the Republika Srpska] was an organ of Serbia and Montenegro 
(as that country was then called), then in law the Respondent would be responsible for the 
VRS' actions. The Respondent would also be responsible in law if the VRS was acting 
on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, the Respondent. In the light 
of the information available to it, the Court has found that it was not established that the 
massacres at Srebrenica were committed by organs of the Respondent. It has also not been 
established that those massacres were committed on the instructions, or under the direction 
of the Respondent, nor that the Respondent exercised effective control over the operations 
in the course of which those massacres were perpetrated. This is the test in international 
law. In fact, all indications are that the decision to kill the adult male population of the 
Bosnian Muslim communify in Srebrenica was taken by some members-of the VRS Main 
StafJ: without instructionsfiom or effective control bv the FRY..  . . The Court has found 
that the Respondent could, and should, have acted to prevent the genocide, but did not. 
The Respondent did nothing to prevent the Srebrenica massacres despite the political, 
military and financial links between its authorities and the Republika Srpska and the VRS. 
It therefore violated the obligation in the Genocide Convention to prevent genocide. 
Id, These Serbia findings will have to be woven into the hture debate on the R2P. They challenge 
the "legislators" of international law to explore approaches by which the legal lacuna in the gap 
separating the responsibility of the state from the responsibility of the NSA, must be filled. I an, 
suggesting that the notion of suspended sovereignty might serve this purpose. 
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of the FFS,82 it pointedly penetrated the core of the legal construct of sovereignty. 
R2P "is testimony to a broader systemic shift in international law, namely, a growing 
tendency to recognize that the principle of state sovereignty finds its limits in the 
protection of 'human sec~rity."'~' This propelled a reconsideration of the concept of 
sovereignty for twenty first century purposes. The legal contours of the R2P have been 
discussed extensively in the larger contexts of state responsibilityE4 and humanitarian 
intervention (including the tension existing between military and humanitarian 
inter~ention).~~ The doctrinal discourse of both state responsibility and humanitarian 
intervention wrestles with the question of establishing when a state's abdication of 
responsibility justifies foreign intervention, and when foreign intervention transforms 
into foreign o c ~ u p a t i o n . ~ ~  It is precisely at this convergence-R2P "links" with FFS- 
to create the point where deterioration in the FFS (severe clash between residual and 
effective sovereignty) is recognized as an instance of suspended sovereignty. 
Hypothetically, operationalizing an eventual legal R2P duty into actual policy 
would trigger both domestic and extra-territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, which is 
commonly considered as a component of sovereignty, may be exercised also without 
owning title to territ~ry.~' Consequently, when territorial jurisdiction, which is "prima 
facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent population living there,"88 has been 
severely tampered with under the condition of a FFS, WP-through invoking extra- 
territorial jurisdiction of foreign actors-may assist in resurrecting the suspended 
competences of the sovereign.89 
82 "[Wlhile sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens 
from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so . . ." A MORE SECURE WORLD, 
supra notel5, at 56 (emphasis added N.G.-0.). 
83 Stahn, supra note 56, at 100-0 1. 
&1 Little if any resolution has been achieved with regard to state responsibility in a situation involving 
a threat to peace. INTERNATIONAL LAWASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE SEVENTY SECOND CONFERENCE, 
Toronto June 2006 (2006) (on file with author). 
85 See Jean-Baptiste Jeangirne Vilmer, Humanitarian Intervention and Disinterestedness, 19 PEACE 
REV. J. SOC. JUST. 
" Whether lead by a single foreign state, an alliance of states, or an international organization. 
Like sovereignty, the doctrine of jurisdiction is an indeterminate doctrine. Danwall, supra note 
56, at 28. 
Id. 
89 See Stahn's description of relevant propositions, supra note 56, at 118-120. 
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C.  International Trusteeship 
My argument in favor of enforcing extra-territorial jurisdiction where the sovereignty 
of a FFS has been suspended, builds on existing legal forms of interference 
with territorial integrity: Lease, servitude, trust, mandate, protectorate, colony, 
and occupation. Specifically, the lease and a re-vitalised concept of trusteeship 
as governing the lease are potentially instrumental both as a political means of 
rapprochement (confidence building) between conflicting parties (state and NSAs 
alike) as well as a legal means to settle disputes. They therefore offer a legal tool 
to "resuscitate" a state's suspended sovereignty. To be sure, U.N. Charter Chapter 
VII, specifically Articles 40 and 41, and complementarity to Article 43, provide for 
the U.N. extra-territorial jurisdiction requisite for the application of an (eventually) 
rejuvenated Chapter XI1 on the International Trusteeship System.9o To be effective, 
this U.N. extra-territorial jurisdiction, when applied to the FFS suspended sovereignty 
situation, must be centralized under the organization's auspices and be unified 
and directly attributable to the U.N., not delegated to member states' individual 
jurisdictional di~cretion.~' Such extra-territorial jurisdiction might be facilitated 
if established in either a lease agreement, where a recognizable government is 
still legally representative of the FFS (e.g., Lebanon prior to the current political 
stalemateg2), or in a trusteeship should a central government no longer exist (e.g., 
S~mal ia ,~ '  or during an interim period such as in Afghanistan after the ouster of 
the Taliban government and concomitantly to the arrangement following the Bonn 
Agreement 200 194). 
I will elaborate on this, and specifically Articles 77(c) and 78, in a later broader version of this 
Paper. Suffice it here to point to the analysis by Stahn, who distinguishes-within R2P three 
relevant types of responsibility (in declining order of "firmness") entrusted to the U.N. and 
transpiring from the four constitutive documents: The responsibility to prevent, to react, and to 
rebuild. Id. at 108-09. 
9' Not excluding delegation of jurisdiction to regional organizations, e.g., NATO operations in 
Afghanistan, and on a case by case basis. 
q2 See, e.g., Sixteenth Delay for Lebanon Poll, ALJAZEERA.NET, Mar. 10, 2008, available at http:/l 
english.aljazeera.netiNR~exeres/2E6F7902-5D35-47FB-9BA3-BA42 lDlDB5OD.htm. 
93 Country Profile: Somalia, BBC NEWS, Mar. 2,2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ahcal 
countrygrofiles/l072592.stm. 
9J Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions, U.N. ~ 0 ~ .  S/200111154 (2001) (the Bonn Agreement). 
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Territorial leases are recognized in international relations and law as an instrument 
enabling a state to exercise control over territory without owning sovereignty over it.95 
As Danwall writes: 
[tloday legal scholars define international territorial leases as 
legal rights exercisable by states over the territory of other states, 
which fall short of absolute sovereignty. These rights are attached 
to the territory and as such they may be enforced even though the 
ownership of the particular territory subject to the rights has passed 
to another sovereign, or in other words they are rights in rem.96 
International trusteeship represented a legal reform developed by the drafters of 
the U.N. Charter, adopted after the mandate system of the League of Nations started 
crumbling. The purpose was to oversee the transition of colonies to independence 
states; its "[mlajor goals were to promote the advancement of people in the Territories 
and to promote their development toward self-government and independence."' From a 
governance perspective, the FFS situation is comparable to that of a colony prior to self- 
determination. The opportunity of reviving98 this means of international governance 
was not included in the work of the High Level Panel appointed by the U.N. Secretary- 
General and charged with proposing reforms, specifically regarding collective security.99 
It is, however, not too late to backtrack and amend this oversight. 
95 Michael Strauss, The Viability of Territorial Leases in Resolving International Sovereignty 
Disputes, address to the Annual Conference of the Association of Borderland Studies (Apr. 14, 
2007) (on file with author) see especially 1. 
96 Danwall, supra note 56, at 40. Some examples are Cuba's Guantanamo Bay lease to the United 
States; China's 99-year lease of Hong Kong's New Territories to Great Britain, which ended in 
1997; lease arrangements in the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty of 1994; France's sovereign rights 
in the Pays Quint Septentrional (Quinto Real Norte), a small territory in Spain; and the United 
States Canal Zone lease from Panama, which ended in 1999. For more details see Noemi Gal- 
Or & Michael Strauss, International Leases as a Legal Instrument of Conflict Resolution: The 
Shab 'a Farms as a Proto-type for the Resolution of Territorial Conflicts, T o u ~ o  INT'L L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008). 
97 Trusteeship Council, Sixty-Fourth Session, 1" Meeting, Oct. 20, 2004. 
98 Which has been considered in the context of international environmental governance. See Eco- 
Logic: U.N. Reform-Restructuring for Global Governance, July/August 1997, available at http:/l 
www.iahf.comlworldiun-refm.html. The Trusteeship Council formally suspended operations on 
November 1, 1994, and is technically "non-existent." Index to the Proceedings of the Trusteeship 
Council, United Nations Dag Hammerskjold Library, UN-I-QUE (UN Info Quest), R00691. 
99 Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Counter-Reformation ofthe Securip Council, 1 J. INT'L L. & RELATIONS 
7 (2006), especially at 7. 
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Interstate leasing emulates the concept of lease in private law and includes three 
main elements: Rights of the lessee, duration of arrangement, and compensation to 
be paid to the lessor.'00 As the definition of international legal personality expands 
and with the inclusion therein of the international organi~ation,'~' and as new needs 
arise in regulating relationships among diverse international actors, there is no reason 
to foresee new circumstances for an international leasing where the lessee is an 
international organization and the lessor-a state. 
The international community, as the trustee of the FFS, may assign a state or a 
group of states, or an international organization, the lease of territory from the FFS for 
the purpose of reconstituting authentic governance and returning the state into "active" 
sovereignty. A chief advantage of such an arrangement lies in the establishment of 
unequivocal jurisdiction.lo2 That such determinacy is desperately needed in a FFS has 
been demonstrated on several occasions in Lebanon, for instance, where UN military 
observer forces lacked the mandate to effectively fulfill the original purpose of their 
Where sovereignty has been suspended, establishing a trusteeship is a first step 
toward the resurrection of sovereignty. However, trusteeship cannot be established in a 
legal vacuum. Arguably, the viability of a trusteeship depends on the effective control 
I W  Strauss, supra note 95, at 1.  
lo' Albeit at a status, and with competences, different from that of the state. 
Io2 At present, jurisdictional indeterminacy is plaguing both the institution of inter-state leasing 
and U.N. Charter, ch. VII, operations. On the one hand, the Guantanamo Bay experience is an 
example for jurisdictional indeterminacy where a bilateral lease and the leased territory are used 
to enable the lessee (U.S.) to by-pass application of its own domestic jurisdiction and international 
commitments. On the other hand, the NATO operation in Afghanistan serves to show that where 
the international community has established its extra-territorial jurisdiction (U.N. Charter, ch. 
VII) it has failed, in some respects, to measure up to the requisite standards of the rule of law. 
NATO forces' jurisdiction which must co-exist with the Afghan domestic jurisdiction, e.g. in the 
treatment of detainees handed over by NATO forces to the Afghan government, is a growing 
concern for it renders the extra-territorial jurisdiction ineffective. A specific example is the recent 
debate regarding Canada's role in the violations of rights of detainees transferred to the Afghan 
authorities, and the "dead e n d  situation Canada (as well as other NATO members operating 
in Afghanistan) faces in its actual ability to comply with both the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions. See Report Raises RedFlagfor Governments Bound by Geneva Conventions, Tm 
GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 25,2007, atA12. 
'03 See letter of July 18, 2006 by the late Major Hess-von Kruedener, Infantry Officer with the 
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, of the Canadian Forces on U.N. Mission Truce and 
Supervision Organization-UNTSO. A Canadian Soldier's Report from South Lebanon, CTV.CA 
NEWS, available at http:llwww.ctv.ca~se~~~et~~~cleNews/story/CTWews/20060718/~id~~~t~ 
lebanon-UN-0607 161200607 181 (last visited Jan. 28,  2008). 
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by the trustee. Therefore, a situation such as Lebanon-where a sovereign FFSs was 
subjected, without its consent, to the control of, and was torn apart by, foreign states 
and a NSA104--entails also a new approach to trusteeship. The trustee must be able 
to engage all actors upon which the restitution of the sovereign competences hinges. 
This, in turn, requires clarification of the status of the relevant actors in international 
law, i.e., their rights and  obligation^.'^^ 
The second step following the establishment of a trusteeship regime consists of 
entering into a co-joint lease agreement with either a central government, if such 
authority exists, or lease-like agreements with actors controlling sections of the 
FFS territory.lo6 The lease or lease-like arrangements will buttress the exercise of 
the trusteeship in an orderly legal fashion; they may encourage rivaling parties to 
negotiate a settlement and could potentially function as a trust building measure. 
They will add certainty and resolution to the application of U.N. Charter Chapter VII 
provisions, and consequently empower the FFS not only the NSA willing to reach an 
agreement. The FFS would be recognized as a party in a lease, not as a dependant 
in a trusteeship tutelage, and thus have secured itself an equal status in the triangular 
contractual relationship between co-lessors and lessee. In order to gain the FFS' 
consent to engage in a lease, on the one hand, and for the NSA to qualify for lessee 
status, on the other hand, both parties must commit to abide by the law governing 
occupation. Thus the lease is contingent upon fulfillment of the respective duties of 
the occupied and the occupier. The lease situation adds certainty to an unclear FFS 
situation107 for "[ilnternational servitudes and territorial leases exploit the gaps in these 
notions [re. territorial issues] and add something new to their scope . . . . [Wlhile they 
may be considered marginal aspects of international law and international relations, 
they in fact are pushing those margins outward and causing both to expand."'08 
'" I.e., expanded occupation as argued earlier herein. 
'05  The status of NSAs is no doubt intricately connected to this Paper's discussion of occupation and 
trusteeship. This is however beyond the scope of the present Paper which, at this stage, contends 
with exploring and proposing an innovative general framework to new challenges. 
l o b  "Lease-like" since the lessor (or guarantor of the lease) in such case is not the sovereign having 
legal title to the territory. 
'07 The principal elements of the lease would be clearly defined when entering a lease agreement. 
For more detail see Michael Strauss, The Viability of Territorial Leases in Resolving International 
Sovereignty Dispute. A Comparative Study (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Centre d'Etudes 
Diplomatiques et Strategiques, 2006), at 34. 1 will not elaborate here on the parallels between 
private and public international law due to lack of space. 
'08 Id. at 3. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Extant occupation law has been discarded for want of political appeal and the 
hurdles challenging enforcement. This Paper explores a new approach to addressing 
situations that "look like" occupation, but fall in between the international legal 
cracks separating international from non-international armed conflicts. In this 
paper, I propose to consider the formulation of a new legal term, namely suspended 
sovereignty. Suspended sovereignty arises where the sovereign is denied control 
over part of, or the entire, state temtory due to (a) para-military control by a NSA 
therein, and where the situation cannot be characterized as a non-international armed 
conflict; (b) foreign military indirect control but no direct armed confrontation with 
the state's military or other armed forces; and (c) the sovereign did not formally andlor 
freely consent to the foreign intervention. I also maintain that this term will lead to 
an expansion of the legal doctrine of occupation. The combination of recognizing 
the condition of suspended sovereignty as (a) a legal state of conflict and temporary 
void of government (fragilelfailed state); (b) a legal order authorizing the peaceful 
intervention by a third party to re-establish sovereignty; and coupling it with twenty- 
first century adapted legal instruments of leasehold and trusteeship, proposes a reform 
to the current legal doctrine of occupation. 
My argument takes advantage of two recent legal and political discourses: The 
FFS and the R2P. I propose focusing on the key concept of sovereignty, which 
underlies the debates surrounding FFS and R2P. Such reconsiderations must address 
two cardinal issues: Sovereignty as an operative condition and sovereignty as a status 
conferred also on NSA and the international organization. I advance the proposition 
that a FFS condition and the R2P duty represent both sides of the same coin labeled 
"sovereignty." Therefore, their articulation is mandatory for ascertaining a state of 
suspended sovereignty as well as the contemplation of legal means to revive once 
suspended sovereignty. Such legal development will take advantage of the available 
legal instrument of international trusteeship and leasehold. These should be considered 
as a means to peacefully establish the rule of law in the FFS territory, and build the 
confidence necessary to arrive at a long lasting resolution of a conflict and restore the 
FFS plenary sovereignty. 
